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Abstract 
Classical models predict that the division of stock returns into dividends and capital appreciation 
does not affect investor consumption patterns, while naïve “spend income, not principal” mental 
accounting rules and other economic frictions can cause investors to have a higher propensity to 
consume from stock returns in the form of dividends. Using two micro data sets, we show that 
investors are indeed far more likely to consume from dividends than capital gains. In the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, household consumption increases with dividend income, 
controlling for total wealth, total portfolio returns, and other sources of income. In a sample of 
household investment accounts data from a brokerage, net withdrawals from the accounts 
increase one-for-one with ordinary dividends of moderate size, controlling for total portfolio 
returns, and also increase with mutual fund and special dividends. Further analysis suggests that 
while several factors may be at work, mental accounting is perhaps the most credible single 
explanation for the results. Finally, our results imply some estimates of the effects of the 2003 
dividend tax cut on aggregate consumption. 
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I. Introduction 
  Microsoft’s $32 billion cash dividend of December 2004 was the largest corporate payout 
ever. Classical models of finance and consumption-savings decisions predict that this dividend 
will have little effect on the consumption of Microsoft investors. Under the assumptions of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961), for example, investors can always reinvest unwanted dividends, or 
sell shares to create homemade dividends, and thereby insulate their preferred consumption 
stream from corporate dividend policies. Thus, in traditional models, the division of stock returns 
into dividends and capital gains is a financial decision of the firm that has no “real” consequence 
for investor consumption patterns.  
Yet there are a number of reasons to think that dividend policy, and dividends more 
generally, may indeed affect consumption. Most obviously, the popular advice to “consume 
income, not principal” suggests a potentially widespread mental accounting practice—discussed 
in detail in Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Shefrin and Statman (1984), and Shefrin and Thaler 
(1988)—in which investors do not view dividends and capital gains as fungible, as in the 
homemade dividends story and traditional theories of consumption, but rather place them into 
different mental accounts from which they have different propensities to consume. Less exotic 
but equally realistic frictions, such as transactions costs (of making homemade dividends) and 
taxes, can also lead an investor to favor consuming dividends before capital appreciation.  
Although the dividends-consumption link is a potentially fundamental link between 
corporate finance and the real economy, little empirical research has pursued the issue. This is 
probably because the most easily available data on consumption and dividends is aggregate time-
series data, which have several limitations. Among other challenges, such data require one to 
identify the effect of a smooth aggregate dividend series using a small number of data points;  2 
such data combine investors and non-investors; and such data face an essentially prohibitive 
endogeneity problem: omitted third variables such as business conditions will jointly affect 
consumption, dividends, and capital appreciation, making it difficult to establish the causality 
behind any correlations. 
In this paper, we study the effect of dividends on investor consumption using two micro 
data sets that provide powerful cross-sectional variation in dividend receipts and capital gains. 
The first is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which is a repeated cross-section with 
expenditure measures and self-reported dividend income and capital gains (or losses). Our CEX 
sample includes several hundred households per year between 1988 and 2001. The second data 
set was introduced by Barber and Odean (2000) and includes the trading records of tens of 
thousands of households with accounts at a large discount brokerage between 1991 and 1996. 
While these portfolio data do not contain an explicit expenditure measure, they complement the 
CEX by allowing us to accurately measure net withdrawals from the portfolio, a novel dependent 
variable in its own right and a precursor to expenditure. The data set also allows us to measure 
the withdrawal rates of different types of dividend income, including ordinary, special, and 
mutual fund dividends, which allows for finer comparisons.  
We start with an analysis of the CEX data. Our most basic approach is to regress 
consumption on realized dividend income, controlling for total returns including dividends. The 
coefficient on dividend income thus captures differences between the consumption responses to 
dividends and capital gains. We find that the coefficient on realized dividend income for total 
consumption expenditure is large, positive, and significant. This basic result is robust to a variety 
of control variables and estimation techniques, including specifications in first differences. It 
suggests that, contrary to classical models, the form of returns does matter for consumption.  3 
We then use the brokerage account data in an effort to test the mechanism behind this 
effect, i.e. we test whether dividends are indeed withdrawn from the household portfolio at a 
higher rate than capital gains. The data strongly confirm this. On average, investors do not 
reinvest ordinary dividends: the propensity to withdraw modest levels of ordinary dividends is 
unity. A fraction of mutual fund and special dividends is also withdrawn. On the other hand, very 
large dividends of any type are not fully withdrawn. As in the CEX data, the effect of capital 
appreciation on net withdrawals is uniformly smaller than the effect of dividends.  
We conduct a variety of subsample splits and robustness tests on each data set. The 
results suggest that the apparent differential effect of dividend income on net withdrawals and 
consumption is at least partly causal, i.e. not arising only because investors who plan to consume 
dividends in the future buy dividend-paying stocks. In particular, we find that investors tend to 
withdraw from both predictable and unpredictable components of dividends. For instance, 
investors often withdraw special dividend income, which is unpredictable by definition.  
In sum, although the CEX and the portfolio data involve completely different households 
and somewhat different data concepts, they lead to qualitatively similar results, with both data 
sets indicating that investor consumption is affected by the form of returns, not just the level. 
What drives this effect? We first evaluate explanations based on well-understood frictions like 
transaction costs, taxes, and borrowing constraints. Upon inspection, however, none of these 
explanations is fully satisfactory. Borrowing constraints are irrelevant in this setting, because the 
substitution of dividends for capital gains has no overall wealth effects, and homemade dividends 
can be created by selling shares. Tax stories are varied, but none seems consistent with key 
aspects of the data. Transaction costs cannot account for, for example, the fact that low-turnover 
and high-turnover households withdraw dividends at similar rates.  4 
While our findings are surely driven by a combination of factors, mental accounting 
seems among the most compelling. The notion that many investors do not view dividends and 
capital gains as fungible seems especially plausible in light of the popular adage to “consume 
income, not principal.” Mental accounting offers a natural explanation for both our main findings 
and certain finer results. For example, ordinary dividends are more likely to be mentally 
accounted for as “current income” than are large special dividends. Hence, the Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988) mental accounting framework predicts a higher propensity to consume from 
ordinary dividends than from large special dividends. This is what we find in net withdrawals 
(where we can measure different types of dividends). Tax and transaction cost explanations, on 
the other hand, do not predict this pattern. 
Our paper builds on an earlier literature that uses aggregate data. Early contributions 
include Feldstein (1973) and Feldstein and Fane (1973), which viewed the equality of the 
propensity to consume from dividends and corporate retained earnings, not capital appreciation, 
as the null hypothesis of interest. Subsequently, Peek (1983) and Summers and Carroll (1987) 
find that capital gains and losses have little effect on aggregate consumption. Poterba (2000) 
surveys studies on the stock market wealth effect.  
To our knowledge, the only paper to use micro data in this context is a contemporaneous 
paper by Rantapuska (2005). He analyzes Finnish investor registry data and finds that there is 
little reinvestment within two weeks after receipts of dividends or tender offer proceeds. His 
results are broadly consistent with and complementary to ours, but there are some important 
differences. In particular, the CEX data allow us to look at actual consumption, not just 
reinvestment. Moreover, reinvestment may occur over horizons much longer than two weeks, an 
issue that our brokerage account data allows us to investigate. Finally, automatic reinvestment  5 
plans are absent in Finland but common in the U.S., so the effect of dividends on consumption 
and reinvestment could be quite different in any case.  
  Our results also relate to evidence that consumers have a relatively high propensity to 
consume moderately-sized cash windfalls. For instance, Souleles (1999) finds that consumption 
responds to federal income tax refunds whether or not the household faced borrowing 
constraints, while Souleles (2002) documents that consumption responds to pre-announced tax 
cuts. Related studies in this vein include Bodkin (1959), Kreinin (1961), Wilcox (1989), Parker 
(1999a), Stephens (2003), and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2005). Intuitively, ordinary 
dividends are like moderate-size windfalls. However, our analysis differs in that we focus on the 
relative propensity to consume two forms of income, dividends and capital gains, holding 
constant the level of the total return, dividends plus capital gains. More broadly, this study falls 
into a growing literature that Campbell (2006) terms “household finance.” 
  At the end of the paper, we briefly consider what our estimates imply for the response of 
aggregate consumption to the May 2003 dividend tax cuts. Alternative scenarios suggest a 
consumption stimulus in the range of $11 billion to $25 billion, which is not insubstantial in 
relation to a standard deviation of total personal consumption expenditure of $66 billion over the 
prior five years.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II analyzes a sample from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey. Section III studies portfolio data from a discount brokerage house. Section 
IV reviews explanations. Section V considers the May 2003 tax cuts, and Section VI concludes.  
 
 
  6 
II.  Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
Our first data set is drawn from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The strength 
of the CEX is detailed data on household consumption and demographics. Its comparative 
weakness, for our purpose, is that dividends and portfolio returns are self-reported and thus likely 
to be noisy. (For this reason, the analysis below is followed by an analysis of a second, 
complementary data set.) After introducing the data and definitions, we describe our empirical 
methodology and then present regression estimates of the effects of dividends on consumption.  
A.  Data and definitions 
The CEX has been conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics since 1980. It is a short 
panel based on a stratified random sample of the U.S. population. Selected households are 
interviewed quarterly for five quarters and are then replaced by new households. As we discuss 
more fully below, the information on financial asset holdings and changes in these holdings over 
the preceding twelve months is collected in the fifth interview; dividends, interest received, other 
income variables, and demographic data are collected in the second and fifth interviews and 
cover the twelve months prior to the interview date. We extract most of the variables from the 
CEX family files, but the data on housing and credit are from the detailed expenditure files.  
Basic variables are as follows. We consider both non-durables expenditure and total 
expenditure (which includes durables) as measures of consumption. A priori it is not clear which 
of the two consumption measures is likely to be affected more strongly by dividends. On one 
hand, non-durables expenditure is less lumpy and could be adjusted more smoothly in response 
to changing dividend income than durables expenditure. On the other hand, durables 
consumption is more discretionary than non-durables consumption, so the household might have 
more flexibility to adjust durables consumption when dividend income changes. We follow  7 
Parker (2001) and define non-durables consumption, C, as the sum of food, alcohol, apparel, 
transportation, entertainment, personal care, and reading expenditure. We use the total 
expenditure variable, as provided in the CEX. In both cases, we sum up consumption over the 
four quarters from the second to fifth interview Dividends, D, are based on the question asking 
for “the amount of regular income from dividends, royalties, estates, or trusts” over the past 
twelve months. We also collect interest, I, received by the household. We use reported income 
after taxes, Y, as a proxy for total income.  
Total wealth, W, is the sum of home equity (sum of property values minus sum of 
outstanding mortgage balances) and financial wealth. Financial wealth is the sum of balances in 
checking accounts, savings accounts, savings bonds, money owed to the household, and stocks 
(holdings of stocks and mutual funds, but also corporate bonds and government bonds that are 
not savings bonds), minus other debt.
1 Before 1988, there is no information on the level of 
mortgage balances, so we use the 1988 to 2001 data only. Also, while for financial assets we can 
measure changes over the twelve months preceding the fifth interview, for other wealth 
components (home equity and “other debt”) we can compute only the change over the nine 
months between the second and fifth interviews.  
Survey participants are asked about the amount of securities purchased and sold over the 
preceding twelve months in their fifth interview. This information allows us to decompose the 
change in the value of stock holdings into an active investment/disinvestment component and a 
capital gains component. In order to compute capital gains, G, we need to make an assumption 
regarding the timing of investment. We assume that half the reported investment was made at the 
beginning of the period and half at the end. 
                                                 
1 The surveys do not ask respondents to include retirement assets, but they also do not ask explicitly to exclude 
them, so it is unclear whether some respondents include them.   8 
We employ a few filters to screen out unusual observations. We require that there is only 
one consumer unit (family) in the household, and that the marital status of the respondent and the 
size of the family remain the same from the second to fifth interview. We require that lagged 
financial wealth be positive, and that a nonzero fraction of this wealth be invested in shares or 
mutual funds. We delete observations where any wealth component or income is topcoded.
2 We 
use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to deflate all variables to December 2001 dollars.  
B.   Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the CEX data. After filters, we have 3,106 
household-year observations. In this sample, the mean non-durables consumption, reported in 
Panel A, is $15,042, and the median is slightly lower. Total expenditure, including durables, is 
three to four times higher. Panels B and C show wealth and income measures. Financial wealth is 
typically around a third of total wealth. Total income, which includes dividends, but not capital 
gains, has a mean of $56,566 and again a slightly lower median. Comparing Panels A and C, one 
sees that on average, total income is slightly higher than total expenditure. For the mean 
household, interest income is $1,264 and dividends total $935.  
As one would expect, the mean capital gain of $363 is relatively small compared with 
total income, and roughly the same order of magnitude as mean interest income. Capital gains 
however do show significant variation across households and across time. Note that the extreme 
values are from wealthy households with a large amount of financial wealth. Moreover, virtually 
all of the largest negative observations on capital gains, including the minimum of -$301,407, 
originate from 2001, where the capital gain measurement period includes the crash in technology 
and internet stock prices during the year 2000 and 2001.  
                                                 
2 To preserve the anonymity of respondents, the CEX administrators reset observations above certain thresholds on 
wealth, income, and some other variables to a cutoff threshold value.   9 
Panel D shows that on average, interest and dividends account for 4% and 2% of total 
income, respectively. The distribution is skewed, with the median household reporting zero 
dividend income. It is likely that some of the zero dividend observations in the CEX result from 
underreporting of dividends by the interviewees. To ensure that our results are not driven by the 
zero-dividend observations, we include a zero-dividend dummy variable in our regressions. 
C.   Empirical Methodology 
The null hypothesis of interest is that capital gains and dividends are fungible, which 
means that households should react similarly to wealth changes that come in the form of a capital 
gain and in the form of a dividend. In other words, only the total return should matter, not the 
split of that return into dividends and capital gains/losses.  
To test this hypothesis, we run specifications in levels, first differences, and log 
differences. We describe and motivate these in turn. Our basic levels specification is as follows:  
  01 2 it it it it it it C a a Z a F gR dD u ′′ =+ + + + + (1) 
where Cit is household i’s consumption in t (specifically, in the levels specification, consumption 
is summed over the four quarters prior to the fifth interview); Zit is a vector of household 
characteristics; Fit is a vector of financial variables that includes income, lagged wealth, and 
interactions with Zit; Rit is the total dollar return on stocks including dividends; and Dit is the total 
dollar dividend income. In Eq. (1), the total stock return is already accounted for with Rit, and 
therefore d = 0 under the null. However, if for some reason a household has a higher propensity 
to consume from dividends than from capital gains, we expect d > 0.  
The levels specification can be interpreted as an approximation to the consumption rule 
used by households. Different consumption models map income, wealth, and other household  10 
characteristics into consumption in different ways.
3 We are agnostic as to which consumption 
model is most accurate. Our goal is simply to distinguish between models in which capital gains 
and dividends are fungible and those in which there is a wedge between the effect of dividends 
and capital gains. Like Hayashi (1985), Carroll (1994), and Parker (1999b), we approximate the 
consumption rule with a range of variables that may be relevant for consumption decisions, 
allowing them to enter linearly, quadratically, and through interactions to approximate the non-
linear consumption function. In the end, the levels specification boils down to asking whether 
two consumers in the same financial situation, with similar income, similar household 
characteristics, and similar total return on financial assets, but different compositions of total 
returns across dividends and capital gains, have different consumption. 
Household characteristics in Zit include the education of the household head (dummies 
for high-school and college graduation), the age of the household head, age squared, family size, 
family size squared, and a set of year-month fixed effects to absorb seasonal variation in 
consumption as well as variation in macro factors. Financial variables in Fit include variables that 
proxy for future income and for current cash-on-hand, including income after tax (excluding 
dividends), income squared, lagged total wealth, lagged total wealth squared, lagged financial 
wealth, lagged financial wealth squared, the percentage of financial wealth invested in stocks and 
its square. We also allow for interactions of age and family size with income, lagged wealth, and 
lagged financial wealth.  
In terms of interpreting an estimate that d > 0, the key question is whether this set of 
controls is sufficient or whether there is some omitted variable that could be positively correlated 
                                                 
3 Under the basic form of the permanent income hypothesis, permanent income determines consumption, so the 
right-hand side variables in Eq. (1) matter to the extent that they are correlated with permanent income. In models of 
buffer-stock saving with impatience such as Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997), consumption depends on the level of 
cash on hand (liquid wealth plus current income) relative to its target level.  11 
with dividends and thus bias upwards the estimate of d. While all of these controls should do a 
reasonable job of approximating households’ consumption rule, it is difficult to fully rule out the 
possibility of some remaining unobserved difference between households that hold dividend 
paying stocks and those that hold nonpaying stocks. To address this omitted variables problem, 
we also run regressions in first differences, which removes any household fixed effects that 
could be correlated with dividend income.  
Differencing is also useful for addressing an important endogeneity concern, namely that 
any relationship between dividends and consumption is not causal but rather reflects the fact that 
households that expect to consume might decide, ex ante, to hold securities that pay the preferred 
consumption stream in the form of dividends.
4 While such an “ex-ante effect” would also mean 
that fungibility does not hold, in the sense that some consumers anticipate their unwillingness to 
consume from principal and adjust their portfolio accordingly, it would not imply a causal effect 
from the composition of returns to consumption. However, to the extent that any such ex-ante 
effect is largely a household fixed effect, with only slow time-variation, differencing should help 
to eliminate it. 
Our basic differences specification is as follows: 
  01 2 it it it it it it C b b Z b Y gR d D e ′′ Δ=+ + Δ + + Δ+. (2) 
We define ΔCit as the difference between fifth and second interview quarter’s consumption, since 
the CEX offers at most four quarterly consumption observations per household. As mentioned 
above, dividends and income in the CEX are measured over overlapping 12-month periods 
leading up to the second and fifth interviews. We define ΔDit and ΔYit as the difference in the 
reported values. Because of the imperfect matching of measurement periods between ΔCit and 
                                                 
4 See Graham and Kumar (2005) and references therein for clear evidence of dividend clienteles. Graham and 
Kumar show that the allocation to and trades of dividend-paying stocks depends on investor characteristics.   12 
ΔDit, the d estimate is likely to be biased towards zero. (The same is true for b2.) Inferences about 
the magnitude of d  will thus be difficult, but a significant positive coefficient will still be 
meaningful, as the null is still d = 0. As before, Zit is a vector of household characteristics and 
time dummies. In some specifications, we also include the level of second-quarter consumption 
as an explanatory variable, because it may pick up some noise that is introduced through the 
measurement-period mismatch between ΔCit and the income variables. 
Finally, to check whether the results are robust to functional form, we also try a third set 
of specifications with log consumption growth as the dependent variable. In that case, we use an 
indicator variable for the sign of dividend growth as our key explanatory variable, because we 
don’t have a clear prediction about how consumption growth would be affected quantitatively by 
dividend growth. For example, a 10% increase in dividends would presumably have a different 
effect on the percentage growth in consumption when dividends are a small proportion of total 
income than when they are a large proportion. By using an indicator variable, we simply estimate 
the average difference in consumption growth between households with dividend increases and 
those with dividend decreases.
5  
D.   Effects of dividends on household consumption 
Table 2 reports estimates of Eq. (1). Specifications in the left columns use non-durables 
consumption as the dependent variable, and those in the right columns use total expenditure. The 
first specification includes total returns, dividends, and a dummy for zero dividends, plus a large 
number of controls described above. The estimates indicate that there is little relationship 
between total returns and consumption, both in economic and statistical terms. But dividends are 
positively related to the level of consumption, and the effect is statistically significant. A $1 
                                                 
5 See Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2004) for a similar dummy variable approach to analyze the effect of tax 
rebates on log consumption.  13 
difference between households in dividends is associated with a 16-cent difference in non-
durables consumption.
6  
The second specification includes the lag of dividends, as a first step toward 
distinguishing between the “ex-ante” (endogenous dividend-consumption clientele) and “ex-
post” (causal) effects that d could capture. (As mentioned previously, our main approach to deal 
with this issue is differencing, which follows below.) Specifically, if ex-ante matching of 
anticipated dividends and consumption were the full story, then lagged and contemporaneous 
dividends should have about the same correlation with current consumption. As it turns out, 
however, the effect of current dividends is far stronger than the lagged coefficient, consistent 
with a causal effect from dividends on consumption that goes beyond ex-ante matching.  
The third and fourth specifications look at the sum of dividends and interest income, Dt + 
It. It seems possible that mental accounting consumers, for example, would treat interest income 
and dividend income similarly; likewise, spending from interest income allows households to 
skirt transaction costs of selling bonds in the same way that spending from dividends avoids the 
costs of selling stock. The results provide some support for these analogies, as the effect of Dt + 
It on consumption is similar to that of Dt.  
The last specifications in Table 2 use total expenditure as the dependent variable. The 
estimated coefficients on Dt and Dt + It are roughly four to five times as high as in the regressions 
with non-durables consumption. As total expenditure is proportionally higher than non-durables 
                                                 
6 Dividends in our data are measured before tax. Our regressions therefore show the relationship between before-tax 
dividends and consumption. If one were to use after-tax dividends, the fraction that goes into consumption would be 
higher than 16 cents of $1. At the same time, however, it is also not clear how households treat taxes on dividends in 
a mental accounting framework. Since taxes on dividends are not withheld, the before-tax dividend cash flow and 
the tax payment occur at different points in time. To what extent households “integrate” the before-tax dividend cash 
flow with the subsequent tax payment, and to what extent it is more appropriate to view them instead as separate 
income streams with possibly different effects on consumption, is an interesting question. Unfortunately, we cannot 
answer this question with the data at hand. Our focus instead is in documenting that dividends have an independent 
effect on consumption, and showing that before-tax dividends affect consumption is sufficient for that purpose.  14 
consumption, on average, these results suggest that dividend income is not used exclusively for 
non-durables consumption but rather boosts expenditures of all types. In all other respects, the 
results in these specifications are similar to those for non-durables.  
It is interesting that there is no evidence of a significant effect of capital gains; indeed the 
point estimates on total returns are negative. Of course, a low (but positive) propensity to 
consume capital gains would not have been surprising. Under the permanent income hypothesis, 
for instance, forward-looking consumers spread the consumption from an unexpected increase in 
wealth over their lifetime, so the coefficient on capital gains is expected to be on the order of the 
real interest rate. From this perspective, what is striking about the results in Table 2 is the far 
higher consumption from the return component that is labeled “dividends.” The very large 
effects of dividends on total expenditure, in particular, strongly suggest that individuals consume 
dividends disproportionately in the period in which they are received.  
Table 3 reports estimates of Eq. (2). The first specification includes total returns, the 
change in dividends, and other controls including a dummy for zero dividends over the prior and 
current 12-month period and, in some specifications, lagged consumption. Since we are 
regressing the change in quarterly consumption (from the second to the fifth interview) on 
changes in dividends measured over 12-month periods (preceding the second and fifth 
interview), we would expect the coefficient estimates on ΔDt to be about one quarter of those on 
Dt in the levels specifications. 
The results indicate that multiplying the coefficient estimates on ΔDt by four yields 
numbers that are at least roughly of the same order of magnitude as the estimates in Table 2, 
though somewhat lower, in particular for the non-durables specifications. The moderate decrease 
is consistent with some ex-ante effect in the levels estimates, but it could also reflect the noise  15 
that is introduced through the imperfect matching of dividends and consumption measurement 
periods. Consistent with the latter possibility, we find that controlling for lagged consumption, 
which should pick up some noise, raises the magnitude of the coefficient on dividend changes. 
But for the non-durables specifications overall, standard errors are large, and the coefficient 
estimates are at best marginally significant. For total expenditure, on the other hand, all 
coefficient estimates for ΔDt  and ΔDt  + ΔIt are statistically significant.  
Table 4 presents specifications in log differences. As mentioned above, the analysis here 
focuses on a dividend-increase dummy variable. Its coefficient measures the average difference 
in consumption growth between households with dividend increases and those with dividend 
decreases. In all specifications, the coefficient estimates on the ΔDt > 0 dummy is positive, and it 
is also significantly different from zero in all but the first two non-durables specifications. But 
even there, the point estimate is economically large: the average household that experiences an 
increase in dividend income increases its consumption by 2% relative to the average household 
with non-increasing dividend income.  
We have also experimented with splitting the sample by age. Dividends account for a 
bigger fraction of income in households headed by older individuals and they are also larger in 
absolute terms: The mean dividend income for households with a household head below age 65 
is $614, while it is $1,818 for households with a household head of age 65 or older. On one hand, 
the consumption effects of dividends could be stronger for older households, because those 
households might be more aware of their dividend income. On the other hand, however, older 
households could be less susceptible to consume from dividends according to a simple mental 
accounting rule because dividends comprise a substantial part of their income.    16 
The results are as ambiguous as the theoretical predictions. For example, re-running the 
base case total expenditure regressions (specification 5) from Table 2, with dividends interacted 
with a dummy variable for age greater than 65, yields a coefficient on the interaction term that is 
negative (-0.43 with a standard error of 0.23) and on the borderline of statistical significance. 
Interacting age with dividends produces similarly insignificant results. This seems appears to be 
consistent with the second argument: that older households’ consumption is less sensitive to 
dividend income. However, even taking the point estimates at face value, dividend income has a 
quantitatively more important effect on dollar consumption for older households than for 
younger ones, because the variation in dividends across older households is so much larger.  
As an additional robustness check, we have also removed capital gains outliers from the 
regression. In surveys like the CEX, where capital gains are based on self-reported information, 
capital gains are likely to have substantial measurement error. We want to ensure that the 
absence of a capital gains effect on consumption is not caused by a few large and potentially 
erroneous outliers. Winsorizing capital gains at their 5
th and 95
th percentile, however, results in 
quantitatively similar estimates.
7 Perhaps more importantly, winzorizing the capital gains data 
leaves the coefficients on dividends are virtually unaffected. Overall, it seems that the results are 
not unduly influenced by outliers.  
In summary, the best available U.S. micro data on consumption suggests that dividends, 
controlling for total returns, have a significant effect on consumption. The relationship is 
generally robust across specifications in levels, simple differences, and log differences.  
 
 
                                                 
7 For example, in the base-case non-durables regression (specification 1) in Table 2, the coefficient on the total 
return drops to -0.02 with a standard error of 0.02. In the base-case total expenditure regression (specification 5) in 
Table 2, the coefficient rises to 0.01 with a standard error of 0.04.  17 
III.  Evidence from household portfolios 
A concern with the CEX data is that dividends and capital gains are likely to be measured 
with substantial error, as they are both self-reported. It is not clear to what extent measurement 
error influences the foregoing results. Furthermore, the results would be made even more 
convincing if we could verify the intermediate, mechanical step between receipts of dividends 
and consumption expenditure—that dividends are in fact withdrawn from brokerage accounts, 
and done so at a higher rate than capital gains. Our second micro data set, based on household 
portfolios, achieves these objectives and thus nicely complements the CEX data. Furthermore, it 
allows us to study net withdrawals from investment portfolios, an interesting and novel 
dependent variable in its own right.
8 And finally, the larger sample size and detail of the portfolio 
data allow for certain robustness tests and sample splits that are not possible in the CEX data. 
A.  Data and definitions 
Our household portfolio data set was introduced by Barber and Odean (2000). It contains 
monthly position statements and trading activity for a sample of 78,000 households that had 
accounts at a large discount brokerage firm. To enter the sample, households were required to 
have an open account during 1991. For sampled households, position statements and accounts 
data were gathered for January 1991 through December 1996. The data include all accounts, 
including margin and retirement accounts, opened by each sampled household at this brokerage. 
For our sample, we exclude margin accounts, IRAs, Keogh accounts, and accounts that are not 
joint tenancy or individual accounts. Securities followed include common stocks, mutual and 
closed-end funds, ADRs, and warrants and options held in these accounts. We focus on common 
                                                 
8 Similar in spirit, Choi et al. (2004) use shifts in savings into 401-K plans to identify changes in consumption.  18 
stock and mutual funds, which represent all, or nearly all, of most households’ portfolios. See 
Barber and Odean (2000) for additional data details. 
We use household-month level observations on net withdrawals, portfolio value, capital 
gains, and total dividends. Net withdrawals C (we use C in analogy with our earlier definitions, 
although, to be precise, we are studying net withdrawals in this data set) are inferred as the 
starting value of assets in the portfolio A, plus capital gains G, plus dividends D, minus the 
ending value of the portfolio. That is, for household i, 
it it it it it A D G A C − + + = −1 , (3) 
where the components that can be directly estimated include total portfolio value, the product of 
price P and quantity Q held in investment j and summed across investments,  
∑ =
j
jt jt it P Q A , (4) 
capital gains, 
( ) ∑ − − − =
j
jt jt jt it P P Q G 1 1 , (5) 
where prices are adjusted for stock splits, and total dividend income, 
∑ − =
j
jt jt it D Q D 1 . (6) 
For simplicity, we suppress the household i subscript on the quantity of each security Q.  
To estimate these quantities from the brokerage data, we pool each household’s accounts 
to obtain positions and trades by household-month. The brokerage data do not directly identify 
dividend income; we match portfolio holdings to the CRSP stock file to measure dividends on 
common stocks and the CRSP mutual fund file to measure dividends on mutual funds. For each 
stock and mutual fund in a households’ portfolio at the beginning of the month, we use the 
monthly CRSP data on dividend distributions to calculate the dollar amount of dividends  19 
received during that month. In this calculation, we assume that the household holds on to these 
securities until the end of the month. For common stock dividends, we follow DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) in using CRSP distribution codes 1232, 1212, 1218, 1222, and 
1245 to identify ordinary dividends and 1262 and 1272 to identify special dividends. We then 
total the dollar amounts of stock and mutual fund dividends across all stocks and funds in a given 
household portfolio to get to a monthly measure of dividends. 
  The data contain outliers due to account openings and closings that do not reflect actual 
consumption and savings decisions. We exclude household-month observations where we cannot 
identify a CRSP mutual fund or common stock match for at least 75 percent of the account value 
at month t-1, and we exclude households where account value falls below $10,000. This leaves 
93,312 household-months of data on lagged account value, dividends, capital gains, and net 
withdrawals. These data still contain some outliers; for instance, the minimum value for net 
withdrawals as a percentage of lagged account value is -2,807.7, indicating a proportionately 
large net inflow of funds. To prevent a few such data points from driving results, we exclude 
household-months in which net withdrawals exceed 50% in absolute value. This screen excludes 
about 0.96% of the sample.
9 The final sample includes 92,412 household-months. 
The advantages of household portfolio data vis-à-vis the CEX data are fairly clear, but 
these data nonetheless do have limitations of their own. One is that we usually do not know how 
important the accounts we observe are in terms of the household’s total wealth, although in a 
fraction of the sample we do have self-reported data on household net worth. In any case, it is not 
clear that this should lead to bias as opposed to just adding noise. Another limitation is that we 
                                                 
9 The results below are robust to choosing different cutoffs. For example, they are quantitatively similar when 5% or 
0.5% of the most extreme observations is eliminated. But some process is necessary: the most extreme single 
observation would account for about one third of the total sum of squared net withdrawals (even though there are 
close to 100,000 observations in total), so any analysis would be practically meaningless.   20 
observe net withdrawals, not consumption. While as mentioned above this means that the 
portfolio data is a useful complement to the CEX, a concern is that dividends and realized capital 
gains may be deposited into a cash account that we cannot observe. If so, and if a portion of 
these funds are eventually reinvested and ultimately reappear in the portfolio, we should not be 
counting that portion as potential consumption. Therefore, an important part of the analysis 
below is to examine the extent to which contemporaneous withdrawals are offset by delayed 
reinvestment; for consumption, we care only about long-run withdrawals.  
B. Summary  statistics 
The size and composition of portfolios are described in Panel A of Table 5. The mean 
account value is $54,400 and the median is $28,400. For the mean household, 82.7% of this 
value is due to common stock holdings and 13.5% reflects mutual funds.  
Changes in portfolio value are in Panel B. In order to make cross-household comparisons, 
we scale net withdrawals, capital gains, and dividend estimates by portfolio value at the end of 
month t-1. The mean household-month in our sample has slight net withdrawals at the rate of 
0.06% per month, while net savings in the median household-month is zero. The average total 
monthly return is positive, at 1.11%. The average dividend income per month, 0.20% of 
beginning-of-month portfolio value, is a significant fraction of the average month’s total return, 
but much less volatile.  
  Dividend income is broken down in Panels C and D. Dividend income is positive in just 
under half of the household-months. For these observations, an average of 77.92% of the 
dividend income is due to ordinary dividends, with mutual funds accounting for almost all of the 
remainder. Special dividends are rare, but can be very large when they do occur.  
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C. Effects of dividends and capital gains on net withdrawals 
  Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of household-month observations of net withdrawals against 
contemporaneous total dividends. The figure clearly shows two modal behaviors with respect to 
dividend income. The line of points indicating a one-for-one increasing relationship between net 
withdrawals and dividends evidences a “zero (contemporaneous) reinvestment” policy; the line 
of points indicating a flat relationship indicates an “automatic reinvestment” policy. The many 
thousands of observations that lie on neither line suggest a positive relationship more generally. 
We omit an analogous scatterplot of net withdrawals as a function of capital gains because it 
shows no visible patterns. 
  Mean and median behaviors are plotted in Figure 2. In Panel A, we break dividend 
income into eleven groups, one for household-months with no dividend income and ten deciles 
for positive-dividend observations. Within each group, we plot median net withdrawals against 
median total dividends. The results suggest that median behavior is to not immediately reinvest 
moderate-size dividends. Net withdrawals increase one-for-one with dividend income over the 
bottom several deciles, i.e. in this range a modal behavior from Figure 1 is also the median 
behavior. 
  Mean dividend-withdrawing behavior is presented in Panel B. We show mean net 
withdrawals for the zero-dividend group and for the mean level of dividends within each of the 
ten positive-dividend deciles. The figure again shows a positive relationship between dividends 
and net withdrawals. Note that the mean behavior is to contemporaneously withdraw most, but 
not all, of larger dividends. (This could be consistent with a mental accounting practice in which 
the large dividends that result from cash acquisitions, for example, are not treated like ordinary 
dividends but rather as principal to be reinvested.)  22 
  The bottom two panels provide an initial look at the effect of capital gains. The contrast 
with the dividends pictures confirms the CEX results: the effect of capital gains appears to be 
much smaller than that of dividends. Panel C shows that regardless of the level of capital gains, 
median contemporaneous net withdrawals are zero. Panel D shows mean behavior, which 
suggests that very high capital gains engender net withdrawals, on average, and very low capital 
gains engender net inflows, on average. There is no clear effect in the intermediate range.  
  In Table 6, we estimate the effects of contemporaneous dividends and total returns on the 
rate of withdrawals. Our first specifications include linear effects only, and then we confirm the 
additional structure suggested in the figures using a piecewise linear specification. Specifically, 
we allow for a differential effect when dividends are in the top decile and a differential effect 
when total returns (primarily capital gains) are smaller than 2.50% in absolute value: 
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We suppress the household i subscripts.  
It may be helpful to explicitly interpret the coefficients. The first regression in the left 
panel indicates that, on average, investors have a propensity to withdraw contemporaneous 
dividends of about 0.35. The second regression shows that, on average, investors have a 
propensity to withdraw contemporaneous returns of 0.02. The third regression shows that for a 
given contemporaneous total return, investors have a 0.35 higher propensity to withdraw from 
the dividends component than from the capital gains component. Because the propensity to 
withdraw from contemporaneous capital gains is almost zero, this also means that the total 
propensity to withdraw from dividends is around 0.35, as in the first regression. Although direct 
comparisons are not appropriate, it is interesting that these coefficients are of the same order of 
magnitude as the effects of dividends and capital gains on total consumption that we estimated in  23 
the CEX data (Table 2 and Table 3). And again, what is most striking is not that the coefficient 
on capital gains is so small, but that the coefficient on dividends is so large.  
As an aside, it may seem that the relatively small coefficient on returns implies that the 
effect of capital gains on consumption is negligible, but this is not obvious. In fact, because the 
range between the 10
th and 90
th percentile is about 30 times bigger for returns than for dividends 
(see Table 5), the point estimates in Table 6 suggest that the variation in withdrawals caused by 
dividends and capital gains may be of roughly similar magnitude. (Of course, we found at best 
weak effects of capital gains in the CEX, so unlike in the case of dividends we are unable to find 
strong evidence that capital gains lead to withdrawal-financed consumption.) In any case, given 
our particular hypotheses, the appropriate focus is on the relative magnitude of the dividend and 
capital gains effects for a given change in wealth, not on the proportion of withdrawal variance 
explained by each effect.  
  Moving to the second panel of Table 6, with piecewise linear effects, the first regression 
indicates a propensity to withdraw contemporaneous dividends of 0.77 for typical levels of 
dividend income and 0.33 (0.77 – 0.44) for unusually high levels of dividend income. The last 
regression shows that for small levels of total returns, investors have a propensity to withdraw 
from contemporaneous capital gains of -0.03 (0.02 – 0.05), i.e. they do not withdraw at all, while 
the differential propensity to withdraw contemporaneous dividends stays the same. All of these 
results are consistent with Figure 2.  
D. Delayed  reinvestment 
While the analysis so far suggests large differences in the withdrawal behavior of 
dividends versus capital gains, and hence that dividends may indeed affect consumption, several 
questions remain. One is the possibility that a portion of dividends (and perhaps capital gains),  24 
rather than being withdrawn for consumption, may just have been temporarily moved to a cash 
account and reinvested in subsequent months. To the extent that this is the case, estimates based 
on contemporaneous effects will overstate the true potential impact on consumption. 
To investigate this effect, we augment our previous model to allow for up to one year of 
delays in reinvestment. The resulting model is unsightly but easy to interpret:  
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Under this specification, when the monthly total return is greater than 2.5% in absolute value, the 
long-run propensity to withdraw capital gains is (r1 + r3). When the monthly total return is 
smaller than 2.5% in absolute value, the long-run propensity to withdraw capital gains is (r1 + r2 
+  r3  +  r4). Likewise, the differential or “extra” long-run propensity to withdraw a small or 
medium dividend income realization is (d1 + d3), while the differential long-run propensity to 
withdraw a top-decile dividend realization is (d1 + d2 + d3 + d4). Note that in this setup, any 
effect of delayed reinvestment shows up empirically as a negative estimate for d3 and d4 (r3 and 
r4), as dividends (capital gains) that are reinvested will be detected as reduced net withdrawals as 
a function of lagged dividends (capital gains).
10  
Table 7 shows that allowing for the possibility of a full year of delayed reinvestment does 
not alter earlier inferences about the effects of dividends. In the simple linear regressions, the 
contemporaneous coefficients are as before, and the effects of lagged dividends are nil. The full 
                                                 
10 In principle, one could also include individual lags of Dt and Rt instead of the summation terms and then sum up 
the estimated coefficients on the individual lags to calculate the total effect of delayed reinvestment. The approaches 
are equivalent when Dt and Rt and their lags, respectively, are uncorrelated. In our data, these correlations are low, 
so both approaches lead to similar results. For simplicity, we report results from the summed lags approach.   25 
piecewise linear model in the rightmost column shows that the long-run propensity to withdraw 
small or medium dividends is 0.73 (0.80 – 0.07) greater than that of capital gains, statistically 
indistinguishable from the 0.77 gap in the short-run propensities to withdraw that we found in 
Table 6, and thus indicating little or no reinvestment of such dividends. On the other hand, the 
differential long-run propensity to withdraw very large dividends is still positive, but is 
considerably smaller, at 0.33 (0.80 – 0.47 – 0.07 + 0.07), which is also the same as the estimate 
we obtained without allowing for delayed reinvestment. Finally, there is little evidence that 
capital gains engender reinvestment.  
Thus accounting for delays in reinvestment does not change the conclusion that there is a 
large difference in the propensities to withdraw dividends and capital gains. Unless households 
in this sample are out of steady state, systematically accumulating cash balances (and doing so 
out of dividends, not capital gains), the results are consistent with the notion that a substantial 
portion of dividend income is permanently withdrawn to finance consumption.  
E. Household  characteristics 
  For robustness tests, Table 8 splits the sample across several household and portfolio 
characteristics. First, we split by portfolio size. These accounts typically represent a rather small 
fraction of net worth, but for about a fifth of the sample, we have self-reported data on net worth 
and tax rates supplied to the brokerage firm at the opening of the account, so we can test whether 
the results extend to households for which the portfolio represents at least half of reported net 
worth. Second, we split by net worth itself. Third, we split by tax rate, which is obviously also a 
proxy for income. Fourth, we split the sample by portfolio turnover.  
The results suggest that the higher propensity to withdraw dividend income is broadly 
robust across the available household characteristics. An apparent exception is that the difference  26 
is insignificant for the below-median tax rate subsample, but this is inconclusive due to the large 
standard errors in this small sample. Wealthier households appear more likely to reinvest very 
large dividends, but again standard errors are too large for any confident conclusions.  
F.  Composition of dividends 
  Intuition and mental accounting theories suggest that it may be inappropriate to treat all 
types of dividends as equivalent. The nonlinear effects documented in Figure 2 and Table 6 may 
be due to differences in the treatment of special dividends and ordinary dividends, for example, 
and the reinvestment of dividends could also vary by type. 
  Figure 3 shows scatterplots of contemporaneous net withdrawals as a function of 
dividends of each type. An immediate result is that the “automatic reinvestment” mode is 
apparent only in mutual fund dividends, likely reflecting formal elections to automatically 
reinvest. In addition, both mutual fund dividend recipients and many ordinary dividend recipients 
engage in the “zero reinvestment” mode. Perhaps because large special dividends are so rare, 
there is little visually apparent pattern in how they are withdrawn or reinvested.  
  Median and mean net withdrawals by dividend type are in Figure 4. The median behavior 
is to withdraw ordinary dividends one-for-one. For mutual fund dividends, the median behavior 
is to withdraw nothing. For special dividends, on the other hand, the median behavior is to 
withdraw. In means, the patterns are rougher, as expected, and affected by the fact that the 
average household is a net saver into its portfolio over this period. Even in means, however, 
there are generally monotonic relationships for dividends of each type, although very high values 
of mutual fund dividends do not increase mean net withdrawals one-for-one.  
  These impressions are confirmed formally in Table 9. Ordinary dividends have a 
propensity to be contemporaneously withdrawn that is 0.90 higher than capital gains, i.e. a  27 
propensity to be contemporaneously withdrawn of near unity versus one near zero. Also, 
reflecting the automatic reinvestment policy pursued by many mutual fund investors, mutual 
fund dividends are withdrawn at a lower rate. Standard errors are too large to make finer 
observations about reinvestment and how behavior changes for unusually large dividends. Small 
special dividends are withdrawn at roughly the same rate as ordinary dividends, while the point 
estimates suggest that large special dividends are mostly reinvested.  
G. Reverse  causality 
  As with the CEX results, the above results may be affected by an endogeneity problem. 
Some households may have chosen their ordinary-dividend paying stocks and, to a lesser extent, 
their mutual funds, ex ante in anticipation of consumption. If so, the evidence presented so far 
does not clearly demonstrate that dividends, particularly ordinary dividends, have a causal effect.  
For the ex-ante effect to dominate, there would have to be a large predictable component 
in dividends such that it is feasible for households to match desired future consumption with 
anticipated dividend streams. Unlike in our CEX analysis, dividends here are scaled by portfolio 
value, which already reduces a potential source of cross-sectional predictability. As it turns out, 
scaled dividends in total (the sum of ordinary, mutual fund, and special) are unpredictable based 
on lagged dividends, i.e. almost all variation is “unexpected”, with twelve months of lagged 
dividends explaining only 4% of the variation in scaled dividends in the current month. Hence 
reverse causality is empirically not a major concern in the total-dividends results that we reported 
above, unless we are to believe that investors are rapidly rebalancing their portfolios in 
anticipation of changing consumption needs.  
Ordinary dividends on their own (scaled by beginning-of-period portfolio value), 
however, are highly predictable, with the one-year lagged value explaining 57% of the variation  28 
in ordinary dividends, and the one-year and three-month-lagged values together explaining 81%. 
Mutual fund dividends are less so, with the one-year lagged value explaining 43% and the three-
month-lagged value (as expected) adding little. Special dividends are, of course, unpredictable 
by definition. Therefore, like our results for total dividends, the results for special dividends are 
not subject to reverse causality concerns.
 
The question in terms of understanding causality is whether this predictable component in 
ordinary and mutual fund dividends alone explains consumption, or whether the unpredictable 
component also plays a role. To examine this, our second specification in Table 9 includes the 
twelve-month lag of dividends as an additional control for the potential ex-ante effect of 
expected consumption on holdings of dividend-paying assets. If the ex-ante effect is the full 
story, and it’s largely a household fixed effect with slow time-variation, then the twelve-month 
lag of dividends and contemporaneous dividends should have about the same correlations with 
withdrawals. And if the ex-ante effect is not a complete explanation, then the coefficient on the 
contemporaneous dividend should be larger than that on the twelve-month lag, since it captures 
effects on withdrawals related to the dividend component that is not predictable by Dt-12.  
Consistent with a modest ex-ante effect, the coefficient estimate on Dt-12 is greater than 
zero for both ordinary and mutual fund dividends, although the effects are insignificant. But the 
coefficients for the contemporaneous dividend terms remain highly significant and far larger than 
the coefficients on the twelve-month lag. We find similar results for mutual fund dividends.  
These results suggest that reverse causality in the form of ex-ante matching of 
withdrawals and dividends most likely plays a fairly modest role in the case of ordinary and 
mutual fund dividends. It plays even less of a role for our other results, including special 
dividends and total dividends. While it is impossible to establish causality with complete  29 
confidence, all of the results are consistent with an important element of causality running from 
dividends to withdrawals—and, based on our analysis of the CEX data, to consumption.  
 
IV. Explanations 
  Two quite different micro data sets both suggest that investors have a differentially 
higher propensity to consume from dividends than capital gains. So far we have focused solely 
on documenting the basic facts and their robustness. Now we move on to potential explanations. 
A. Borrowing  constraints 
  A standard explanation for the high sensitivity of consumption to current income is 
borrowing constraints.
11 However, borrowing constraints by themselves do not predict a different 
propensity to consume from dividends and capital appreciation. The substitution of dividends for 
capital gains has no overall wealth effects, and homemade dividends can always be created by 
buying and selling shares. Hence, borrowing constraints are not an important factor. 
B.   Transaction costs 
  The transaction costs of making homemade dividends are an a priori more relevant factor. 
Perhaps households recognize that reinvesting dividends, especially the modest levels that accrue 
in the smaller accounts in our sample, would require the purchase of an odd lot, which carries 
relatively high transaction costs. To the extent such costs are substantial, rational households 
should prefer to consume from recent dividends rather than from selling shares. 
The CEX data allow us to examine a transaction cost explanation in which the trading 
costs (and perhaps taxes) of creating extra homemade dividends constrain consumption. For 
households where income exceeds total expenditure, this constraint does not bind: These 
                                                 
11 A closely related, but behavioral, explanation for the high propensity to consume current income is hyperbolic 
discounting as in Angeletos et al. (2001).  30 
households could create homemade dividends at no cost by simply saving less. In unreported 
results, we find coefficients of a similar magnitude and generally lower standard errors (0.90 
with a standard error of 0.12 in a variation on specification 5 in Table 2) among households that 
save income, casting doubt on this effect as a complete explanation.  
The brokerage data results in Table 8 also contain results that cast doubt on transaction 
costs as a complete explanation. First, if households view odd lot transaction costs as an 
important consideration, one might expect a higher propensity to withdraw dividends in smaller 
accounts, which face the odd lot costs more often. But the propensity to withdraw dividends 
appears not to depend on the size of the portfolio. Second, the propensity to withdraw dividends 
is similar, if not even higher, for high-turnover households. These households would be able to 
reinvest unwanted dividends at little, if any, marginal cost; in other words, again, the transaction 
costs are not binding.
12  
C. Taxes 
Perhaps investors fail to fully reinvest dividends (i.e., have a higher propensity to 
withdraw them) because they have a policy of withholding a portion for federal and state taxes. 
Of course, taxes can be paid from any source, so this story is founded on mental accounting. 
Table 8 shows that high-tax households are more likely to withdraw dividend income. In fact, the 
difference between lower-tax and higher-tax is much too large (although standard errors are also 
large) to attribute to differential taxation: higher-tax households withdraw 100% of small and 
medium dividends, far more than they would need to cover taxes. 
  Another tax consideration is the higher tax rate of dividend income than capital gains that 
prevails in our sample period. Perhaps households have made mistakes ex ante in buying the 
                                                 
12 See Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) for more general arguments that investors trade too much and fail 
to properly consider transaction costs.  31 
highly-taxed dividend-paying assets or purchased them at a discount, and ex post, given their 
holdings, it makes sense to finance consumption through dividends rather than capital gains. But, 
developing this same idea further, many households in our sample have individual stocks with 
accumulated capital losses at any given time, so from an ex post tax perspective these households 
should consume from realized losses even before dividends. Yet Odean (1998) documents that 
investors are more likely to sell winners than losers in every month except December.  
D.  Different “permanence” of dividends and capital gains 
The results might be reconciled with fully optimizing, forward-looking behavior if stock 
returns have permanent and transitory components. In our regressions we control for total 
returns, and so dividends do not add any additional information about the size of wealth shocks, 
but if changes in dividends are more strongly correlated with the permanent component of stock 
returns than with the transitory component, changes in dividends could provide some 
information about the permanence of wealth shocks.
13 In this case, one would expect dividends 
to be correlated with consumption even after controlling for total returns.  
At the level of the aggregate market, such an explanation could have relevance, although 
it would be difficult to distinguish it from other explanations such as mental accounting.  Poterba 
and Summers (1988), Fama and French (1988), and Campbell and Shiller (1988) find that a large 
proportion of market-level return variation is transitory, driven by temporary movements in 
discount rates, and Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) find empirical support for the idea that 
aggregate consumption responds more to permanent than to transitory changes in asset values. 
                                                 
13 Note that the issue of permanence of wealth shocks correlated with dividends is unrelated to the issue of whether 
companies set dividends equal to the permanent component of earnings. It is perfectly possible that earnings of a 
company have a strongly transitory component, while the stock returns are entirely permanent and vice versa. The 
relevant issue here is the permanence of stock returns, not earnings.  32 
However, our results are driven by cross-sectional, not aggregate variation in returns and 
dividends. This is an important difference, because movements in discount rates are systematic, 
driven by macro variables. As a result, the return variation induced by changes in discount rates 
is, to a large extent, a common component across stocks: Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen, Polk, 
and Vuolteenaho (2005) find that only a small fraction of individual stock return variation 
around the market return is transitory. The time fixed effects in our regressions absorb aggregate 
movements in asset values, leaving the market-adjusted and largely permanent component of 
returns. Thus different permanence of dividends and capital gains also cannot explain our results.  
E. Mental  accounting 
  Finally, a higher propensity to consume from dividends than capital gains is predicted by 
typical mental accounting theories. Indeed, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) explicitly describe the 
higher propensity to consume from dividends than capital appreciation as an important (but as 
yet untested) prediction of their mental accounting framework.  
In the Shefrin and Thaler model, households place wealth into one of three mental 
accounts: “current income,” “current assets,” and “future wealth.” Like Shefrin and Statman 
(1984), Shefrin and Thaler argue that the propensity to consume wealth categorized as current 
income, such as dividends, is greater than the propensity to consume wealth categorized as 
assets, such as capital and its appreciation. Their model thus is consistent with the popular advice 
to “spend from income, not from principal.” 
Our main results fit well with these predictions. The propensity to withdraw and consume 
dividends is indeed far higher for dividends than capital gains. Moreover, in the CEX data, the 
propensity to consume dividends is similar to the propensity to consume labor income, consistent 
with the notion that they are both placed in the “current income” mental account.  33 
In addition, mental accounting also seems to offer more natural explanations for some 
finer aspects of our results than the other theories. For example, it is natural that ordinary 
dividends and small special dividends are categorized as “current income” to a greater extent 
than are special dividends, while special dividends, in turn, are still more “income-like” than 
capital appreciation. Under mental accounting, one would expect a higher propensity to consume 
ordinary than large special dividends and a higher propensity to consume large specials than 
capital gains. Table 9 shows precisely this pattern. 
The underlying psychology behind this sort of mental accounting is an important open 
question. Shefrin and Statman (1984) discuss self control and prospect theory as potential 
psychological roots. Another anecdotally plausible possibility is that, although firm-level stock 
returns are largely permanent, individuals do not view them as such. A quasi-rational rule of 
thumb for a passive investor facing perceived stock market mispricing may then be to consume 
dividends but not capital gains.  
Mental accounting of any type suggests bounded rationality, and so a natural way to close 
this discussion is to comment on the welfare consequence of deviating from fully optimizing 
behavior in this setting. We suspect that these consequences are relatively small for two reasons. 
First, dividends make up a small fraction of total portfolio returns. Second, and more 
importantly, dividends have a much lower standard deviation. Corporations smooth dividends, 
adjusting only partially and only to the permanent component of earnings, as captured by the 
Lintner dividend model. This behavior on the corporate side limits the welfare consequences of 
an investor rule of thumb to “consume from dividends.” 
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V.   The May 2003 dividend tax cut 
  The Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduced the maximum 
federal tax rate on dividend income from over 38% to 15%. Poterba (2004) reports that after 
taking into account state income taxes and the federal income-tax deductability thereof, the 
average household marginal tax rate on dividends fell from 32.1% in 2002 to 18.5% in 2003.  
The tax cuts were designed to stimulate growth. Reducing the double taxation of 
corporate profits was thought to lower the cost of capital and thereby spur capital formation and 
growth. Our results suggest that the dividend tax cut of 2003 may have had another, more direct, 
impact on growth through its impact on household consumption, just as the Microsoft dividend 
might have had a measurable impact on consumer spending. An interesting exercise then is to 
use our estimates from (pre-2003) micro data to assess how much the increase in after-tax 
dividend income may have increased aggregate consumption.  
  An important preliminary note is that taxes are not withheld when dividends are paid, so 
the May 2003 tax cut did not have a direct effect on the cash flows occurring on the date when 
the dividends are paid. One caveat is that our estimates are based on how individuals’ 
consumption reacts at that point. So, for our estimates to be valid measures of the propensity to 
consume from after-tax dividend income, we need to assume that individuals’ monthly 
withdrawal behavior fully reflects the relevant taxes that are to be paid when the tax year ends. 
For this exercise, we will assume that our marginal propensities to consume pre-tax dividends in 
Tables 2 and 4 come from a constant propensity to consume after-tax dividends, or  
() t tax after t tax pre MPC MPC τ − ⋅ = − − 1 , . (9)  35 
A second caveat is that our estimates come from a representative sample of US households. 
Dividends are paid disproportionately to the highest income households. For now, we will 
assume that our estimates apply, making these upper bound impacts. 
  We first consider a scenario in which the dividend tax cut has no effect on the supply of 
dividends by corporations. In this case, the impact on consumption is simply the change in the 
pre-tax MPC times dividends D. Substituting the appropriate tax rates into Eq. (9) yields 
() D MPC D MPC MPC tax pre tax pre tax pre ⋅ ⋅ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
−
= ⋅ − − − − 2002 ,
2002
2003
2002 , 2003 , 1
1
1
τ
τ
. (10) 
According to Table 1.12 of the National Income and Product Accounts, U.S. corporations paid 
$399 billion in net dividends in 2002, and the Flow of Funds Accounts (2004) indicate that 
taxable households owned 58% of corporate equity as of 2003. Therefore, under the assumption 
that taxable households hold dividend-paying stocks in the same proportion as the average 
investor, taxable households received $231 billion in corporate dividends in 2002. With a fall in 
the dividend income tax rate from 32.1% to 18.5% and a pre-tax MPC of 0.4—a number that 
appears to be around the middle of our baseline estimates—we obtain $18.5 billion as the 
estimated effect on aggregate consumption. Table 4 points to a pre-tax MPC somewhat lower 
than 0.4, while Table 2 suggests a value above 0.7. At this high end, where the after-tax MPC is 
essentially 1.0, the estimated effect for 2003 is $31.4 billion. 
  A second scenario is that the dividend tax cut, by reducing the relative tax disadvantage 
on dividend income, increased the supply of dividends. Chetty and Saez (2005) and Poterba 
(2004) suggest that the tax cut caused an increase in dividend payouts. In fact, Chetty and Saez 
find that a sample of firms with limited tax incentives—the largest shareholder is not taxable—
had no increase in initiation rates, for example, and thus attribute the entire change to tax effects. 
On the other hand, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2006) survey hundreds of financial  36 
executives in the wake of the tax cut and find that they only occasionally cite the tax cut as a 
cause of payout decisions. Stock market sentiment may also have affected dividend behavior 
during this period, as firms initiated or increased dividends to attempt to distance themselves 
from the non-dividend paying “new economy” firms that crashed in 2000 and 2001 (Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a,b)). In any case, for the sake of argument suppose that the entirety of the 
observed change in net dividends from 2002 to 2003, i.e. from $399 billion to $425 billion, was 
due to the tax cut. Recall that the pre-tax MPC rises as the tax rate falls, from 0.4 to 0.48: 
2002
2003
2002 , 2003 , 1
1
τ
τ
−
−
⋅ = − − tax pre tax pre MPC MPC . (11) 
Applying this estimate to the pre-tax increase in dividends, and again taking into account the 
ownership fraction of taxable households, the supply channel adds another $7.2 billion to the 
effect on consumption, for a total effect of $25.7 billion. At the higher MPC estimate, the total 
effect is $43.7 billion.  
Dividends continued to increase in 2004 to $508 billion, excluding the large Microsoft 
payout, so this calculation might still underestimate the effect for subsequent years. Let us 
suppose the tax cut took two years to have its full effect, and therefore take the rise from the 
2002 to the 2004 value as the supply increase. Then, the estimates of total consumption effects in 
the previous paragraph rise to $48.8 billion and $82.9 billion, respectively.  
  In an effort to put these estimated changes in consumption, which range from $18.5 
billion to $82.9 billion, into some perspective, consider that total personal consumption 
expenditure in 2003 was $7,703 billion, while the average increase in total personal consumption 
over the prior five years was $364 billion with a standard deviation of $66 billion. Against this 
standard deviation, effects on the order of those estimated above do not seem trivial.  
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VI.   Conclusion 
  How investors consume from dividends versus capital gains is important to a range of 
questions in corporate finance, macroeconomics, behavioral economics, and tax policy. Classical 
theories suggest that investor consumption patterns are independent of how returns are split into 
dividends and capital gains, while mental accounting and various economic frictions motivate an 
alternative hypothesis that investors are relatively more likely to consume dividends. The 
contribution of this study is to exploit the cross-sectional variation in two household-level data 
sets in order to document the effect of dividends on consumption.  
The main finding is that consumption indeed responds much more strongly to returns in 
the form of dividends than returns in the form of capital gains. Data from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) show a strong relationship between household consumption and 
dividends, controlling for total returns (which includes dividends). A sample of household 
portfolio data also show that dividends are much more likely than capital gains to generate 
withdrawals from the investment account, thus illustrating the mechanical process of translating 
dividend income into consumption. A review of alternative explanations suggests that the results 
may in part reflect mental accounting processes of the sort summed up in the adage, “consume 
income, not principal.”   38 
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Figure 1. Net withdrawals versus dividends: Scatter plot. We plot monthly net withdrawals against 
contemporaneous dividends. Net withdrawals are equal to household monthly net withdrawals. All data are scaled 
by household account value in period t-1 and expressed in percentage terms. For the plot, we only include 
household-month observations with dividends greater than zero.  
 
    
Figure 2. Net withdrawals of dividends and total returns: Decile plots. We sort the data into groups according to monthly dividends and total returns and 
compute the corresponding level of net withdrawals. The first two panels show dividend sorts. The eleven groups include ten deciles for months with positive 
dividends and a single group for months with zero dividends. The second two panels show total returns sorts. The ten groups break the sample into deciles 
according to monthly total returns. We plot within group median (average) net withdrawals versus median (average) dividends in Panels A and C (Panels B and 
D). Net withdrawals are equal to the monthly net withdrawals by household. All data are scaled by household account value in period t-1 and expressed in 
percentage terms. 
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Figure 3. Net withdrawals of dividends by type: Scatter plots. We plot monthly net withdrawals against contemporaneous ordinary, mutual fund, and special 
dividends. Net withdrawals are equal to household monthly net withdrawals. All data are scaled by household account value in period t-1 and expressed in 
percentage terms. For the plot, we only include household-month observations with dividends greater than zero.  
 
  Panel A. Net withdrawals versus ordinary dividends  Panel B. Net withdrawals versus mutual fund dividends 
     
 
    Panel C. Net withdrawals versus special dividends 
      
Figure 4. Net withdrawals of dividends: Ordinary, mutual fund, and special dividends. We sort the data into 
groups according to monthly ordinary, mutual fund, and special dividends and compute the corresponding level of 
net withdrawals. The first two panels show ordinary, common stock dividend sorts; the second two panels show 
mutual fund dividend sorts; and the last two panels show sorts on the remaining dividends, including special 
dividends, liquidating dividends, and cash acquisitions. In each case, the eleven groups include ten deciles for 
months with positive dividends and a single group for months with zero dividends. We plot within group median 
(average) net withdrawals versus median (average) dividends in Panels A, C, and E (Panels B, D, and F). Net 
withdrawals are equal to the monthly net withdrawals by household. All data are scaled by household account value 
in period t-1 and expressed in percentage terms. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: Consumer expenditure survey data, 1988-2001. We report means, medians, and 
standard deviations for annual consumption, wealth, and income in the short-panel CEX. Non-durable consumption 
is equal to the sum of food, alcohol, apparel, transportation, entertainment, personal care, and reading expenditure 
over the four quarters from a household’s second to fifth interview. Total expenditure, which includes durables, over 
the same period is taken directly from the CEX files. Income is the after-tax income over the prior four quarters, as 
reported by households in their fifth interview. It includes income from dividends (income from dividends, royalties, 
estates, or trusts) and interest income, but not capital gains. Total wealth is measured as the sum of home equity and 
financial wealth. We define financial wealth as the sum of checking and savings accounts balances, holdings of 
savings bonds, money owed to the household, and stock holdings (stocks plus mutual funds plus small positions in 
corporate and government bonds other than savings bonds) minus other debts. We compute dollar capital gains as 
the difference between the change in reported stock holdings over four quarters and the reported net investment in 
stocks during the same period. We limit the sample to households with nonzero financial wealth invested in stocks 
and nonmissing data on income and consumption. We also require that there is only one consumer unit (family) in 
the household and that the marital status of the respondent and the family size remain unchanged from the second to 
fifth interview, and that none of the wealth component is topcoded. We use the CPI to deflate all variables into 
December 2001 dollars.  
 
  N  Mean 50%  5% 95%  Min Max 
Panel A. Consumption 
Non-Durable 
Consumption  3,106 15,042 13,698  4,463 30,003  1,347 78,548 
Total  Consumption  3,106 48,076 44,582 15,549 91,892  4,955  201,559 
Panel B. Wealth 
Financial  Wealth  (t-1)  3,106 67,700 38,701  2,928  222,207  14  984,165 
Total  Wealth  (t-1)  3,106 161,822 127,276  10,943 428,919  190  1,199,269 
Panel C: Income 
Income (Yt)  3,106 56,566 52,316 12,282  115,505  49  303,793 
Interest income (It)  2,869 1,264  145  0 6,383  0  86,391 
Dividends (Dt)  3,106  935 0 0  4,751 0  144,658 
Other  income  2,869 54,128 50,526 10,192  112,245  -13,823  302,238 
Capital gains (Gt) 3,106  363  0  -16,014  18,988  -301,407  181,503 
Panel D. Composition of Income and Capital Gains (%) 
Interest  income  2,869 4.2 0.2 0.0  19.1  -137.1  2,086.4 
Dividends  3,106 2.1 0.0 0.0  12.0  -36.4  236.7 
Other  income  2,869 89.3 97.5 45.3  122.2  -13,249.2  3,996.0 
Capital  gains  3,106 4.4 0.0  -27.3  38.2  -5,216.1  13,397.0 
Panel E. Control Variables 
Financial Wealth Invested 
in Stock (%, t-1)  3,106 56.19 60.26  3.76 97.94  0.05  100.00 
Age  3,106 52 49 30 80 21 93 
Family  Size  3,106 2 2 1 5 1  11  
Table 2. Consumption of dividends and other sources of income: Consumer expenditure survey data in levels. 
OLS regressions of consumption on total returns, dividends, and interest income. Non-durable consumption is equal 
to the sum of food, alcohol, apparel, transportation, entertainment, personal care, and reading expenditure over the 
four quarters from a household’s second to fifth interview. Total expenditure, which includes durables, over the 
same period is taken directly from the CEX files. Total returns, dividends, and interest income cover the same four 
quarters. Lagged dividends cover the four quarters ending with the second interview. Household Controls: Family 
Size, HS Education, College Education, Age. Income and Wealth: Income (covering the same four quarters), 
Lagged income (covering the four quarters ending with the second interview), Financial Wealth (period ending four 
quarters prior to the fifth interview), Total Wealth (period ending four quarters prior to the fifth interview), Percent 
of Wealth in Stocks (period ending four quarters prior to the fifth interview). Interactions (HC x HC): HS 
Education*Age, College Education*Age, Family Size*Age, Age
2, Family Size
2. Interactions (HC x IW): Financial 
Wealth*Age, Income*Family Size, Total Wealth*Family Size, Income
2, Total Wealth
2, Financial Wealth
2, 
Percentage of Wealth in Stocks
2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. All variables deflated 
by the CPI.  
 
  Non-durable consumer 
expenditure  Total consumer expenditure 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Rt = Gt + Dt  -0.01 -0.01      -0.01 -0.01     
  (0.01) (0.01)     (0.02) (0.02)    
Dt  0.16 0.16      0.75 0.72     
  (0.04) (0.05)     (0.14) (0.14)    
Dt-1    0.01     0.14   
    (0.04)     (0.11)   
{Dt = Dt-1  =  0}  -694 -688      -915 -772     
  (249) (253)      (639) (641)     
Rt = Gt + Dt + It     -0.01  -0.01    -0.02  -0.02 
     (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.02)  (0.02) 
Dt + It     0.13  0.12    0.58  0.56 
     (0.04)  (0.04)    (0.13)  (0.13) 
Dt-1 + It-1      0.03     0.06 
      ( 0 . 0 3 )      ( 0 . 0 9 )  
{Dt + It = Dt-1 + It-1  =  0}     -595  -566    -980  -922 
     (267)  (268)    (684)  (687) 
          
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls: Household Characteristics (HC)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls:  Income  and  Wealth  (IW)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interactions:  HC  x  HC  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interactions:  HC  x  IW  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
N  2,796 2,796 2,410 2,410 2,796 2,796 2,410 2,410 
R
2  0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64  
Table 3. Consumption of dividends and other sources of income: Consumer expenditure survey data in 
differences. OLS regressions of changes in consumption on total returns, changes in income, changes in dividends, 
and changes in interest income. Non-durable consumption is equal to the sum of food, alcohol, apparel, 
transportation, entertainment, personal care, and reading expenditure. Total expenditure, which includes durables, is 
taken directly from the CEX files. We use the difference between quarterly consumption in the fifth (and last) 
interview and the second interview three quarters earlier. Total returns are measured over the four quarters from a 
household’s second to fifth interview. We take the difference between annual dividends, interest, and other income 
ending in the fifth interview and the second interview three quarters earlier. Household Controls: Family Size, HS 
Education, College Education, Age. Interactions (HC x HC): HS Education*Age, College Education*Age, Family 
Size*Age, Age
2, Family Size
2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. All variables deflated by 
the CPI.  
 
  Changes in non-durable consumer 
expenditure  Changes in total consumer expenditure 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Rt = Gt + Dt  -0.003  -0.002    0.006  0.004   
  (0.003) (0.003)     (0.008) (0.008)     
ΔDt  0.017 0.005     0.093 0.057     
  (0.009) (0.010)     (0.029) (0.028)     
{Dt = Dt-1  =  0}  -279 -127     -850 -833     
  (92) (110)     (256) (255)     
Δ(Yt - Dt)  -0.001 0.000     0.025 0.034     
  (0.003) (0.004)     (0.007) (0.008)     
Rt = Gt + Dt + It     -0.004  -0.004    0.003  0.002 
     (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
ΔDt + ΔIt     0.009  0.007    0.056  0.056 
     (0.008)  (0.008)    (0.028)  (0.028) 
{Dt + It = Dt-1 + It-1  =  0}     -268  -78    0  -732 
     (105)  (127)    (0)  (277) 
Δ(Yt - Dt - It )     -0.002  0.000    0.028  0.039 
     (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.008)  (0.010) 
Ct-1  -0.678   -0.703   -0.621   -0.627  
  (0.047)   (0.049)   (0.041)   (0.045)  
          
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls: Household 
Characteristics (HC)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interactions:  HC  x  HC  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
N  2,796 2,796 2,410 2,410 2,796 2,796 2,410 2,410 
R
2  0.38 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.37 0.07 0.39 0.08  
Table 4. Consumption of dividends and other sources of income: Consumer expenditure survey data in log 
differences. OLS regressions of changes in log consumption on log total returns, changes in log income, changes in 
dividends, and changes in interest income. Non-durable consumption is equal to the sum of food, alcohol, apparel, 
transportation, entertainment, personal care, and reading expenditure. Total expenditure, which includes durables, is 
taken directly from the CEX files. We use the difference between log quarterly consumption in the fifth (and last) 
interview and the second interview three quarters earlier. Total returns are measured over the four quarters from a 
household’s second to fifth interview. We use an indicator variable equal to one if annual dividends and interest 
ending in the fifth interview exceed the second interview three quarters earlier. We use the difference between log 
annual income in the fifth interview and the second interview three quarters earlier. Household Controls: Family 
Size, HS Education, College Education, Age. Change in Income Controls: Change in Income (difference in annual 
income from the second to the fifth interview). Interactions (HC x HC): HS Education*Age, College 
Education*Age, Family Size*Age, Age
2, Family Size
2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All variables deflated by the CPI.  
 
  Changes in log non-durable consumer 
expenditure 
Changes in log total consumer 
expenditure 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
log (1+ (Gt + Dt)/FWt-1)  -0.034 -0.013      0.011 -0.002     
  (0.025) (0.029)     (0.030) (0.034)     
{ΔDt > 0}  0.026 0.020     0.074 0.083     
  (0.026) (0.029)     (0.024) (0.028)     
{Dt = Dt-1  =  0}  -0.035 0.002      -0.017 0.017     
  (0.022) (0.025)     (0.021) (0.025)     
Δlog (Yt - Dt)  0.010 0.020     0.035 0.047     
  (0.012) (0.014)     (0.012) (0.014)     
log (1+ (Gt + Dt + It)/FWt-1)     -0.031  -0.003    0.010  0.003 
     (0.027)  (0.032)    (0.033)  (0.038) 
{ΔDt + ΔIt > 0}     0.036  0.042    0.029  0.047 
     (0.018)  (0.021)    (0.017)  (0.019) 
{Dt + It = Dt-1 + It-1  =  0}     -0.036  0.007    -0.040  -0.003 
     (0.020)  (0.022)    (0.018)  (0.020) 
Δlog (Yt - Dt - It)     0.009  0.022    0.035  0.049 
     (0.013)  (0.015)    (0.014)  (0.016) 
log Ct-1  -0.441   -0.451   -0.456   -0.440  
  (0.021)   (0.023)   (0.021)   (0.023)  
          
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls: Household 
Characteristics (HC)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interactions:  HC  x  HC  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
N  2,764 2,764 2,369 2,369 2,764 2,764 2,369 2,369 
R
2  0.26 0.06 0.27 0.08 0.29 0.07 0.28 0.08  
Table 5. Summary statistics: Household portfolio data. Monthly net withdrawals are estimated as a household’s 
account value at t-1 (aggregating across all eligible accounts held by the household) less the account value at t plus 
dividends and capital gains earned on the account holdings at t-1. Dividends are equal to the dividend yield from 
CRSP and the CRSP mutual fund database in month t on common stock and mutual fund account holdings at t-1. 
Capital gains are the capital appreciation from CRSP and the CRSP mutual fund database in month t on common 
stock and mutual fund account holdings at t-1. Ordinary dividends are equal to the dividend yield from CRSP 
(distribution codes 1000 through 1999 excluding codes 1262 and 1272) on common stock account holdings at t-1. 
Mutual fund dividends are equal to the dividend yield from the CRSP mutual fund database on mutual fund account 
holdings at t-1. Special dividends are all other dividends. All data are scaled by household account value in period t-
1 and expressed in percentage terms. We exclude observations where we cannot identify a CRSP mutual fund or 
common stock match for more than 75 percent of the household account value at t-1; households where account 
value falls below $10,000; margin accounts; and accounts that are not joint tenancy or individual accounts. We 
further exclude observations where the absolute value of consumption exceeds 50%. This screen eliminates 900 
observations, or 0.96% of the sample.  
 
 N  Mean  50%  10%  90%  Min    Max 
Panel A. Portfolio Composition 
At-1  ($000)  92,412  54.41  28.43  13.85 99.78 10.00  5018.89 
Common Stocks (%)  92,412  82.69  0.00  0.00  100.00  0.00  100.00 
Mutual  Funds  (%)  92,412  13.49  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 
Other Assets (%)  92,412  3.82  100.00  0.01  100.00  0.00  25.00 
Panel B. Dividends, Capital Gains, and Withdrawals (%) 
Withdrawals Ct/At-1 92,412  0.06  0.00  -0.70  0.99  -50.00  50.00 
Dividends Dt/At-1  92,412  0.20  0.00  0.00 0.55 0.00  102.39 
Returns Rt/At-1 92,412  1.11  1.06  -6.13  8.28  -73.96  153.47 
Panel C: Dividends by Type (%) 
Ordinary Dt/At-1  92,412  0.12  0.00  0.00 0.43 0.00  2.96 
Mutual Fund Dt/At-1  92,412  0.07  0.00  0.00 0.07 0.00 29.91 
Special Dt/At-1  92,412  0.01  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  102.39 
Panel D. Composition of Dividends by Type where Dt>0 (%) 
Ordinary Dt/At-1 44,509  77.92  100.00  0.00  100.00  0.00  100.00 
Mutual Fund Dt/At-1 44,509  21.79  0.00  0.00  100.00  0.00  100.00 
Special Dt/At-1  44,509  0.30  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  100.00  
Table 6. Net withdrawals of dividends and total returns: Univariate regressions. OLS regressions of net 
withdrawals on dividends and total returns. Net withdrawals is equal to household monthly net withdrawals. All data 
are scaled by household account value in period t-1 and expressed in percentage terms. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
  Linear Regressions  Piecewise Linear Regressions 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
Intercept  -0.01 0.04  -0.03  -0.06 0.04  -0.07 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dt/At-1  0.35   0.35  0.77   0.77 
  (0.09)   (0.09)  (0.09)   (0.09) 
Dt/At-1* {Dt/At-1 > 90
th  Pctle}      -0.44   -0.44 
      (0.11)   (0.11) 
Rt/At-1   0.02 0.02   0.02 0.02 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Rt/At-1* {|Rt/At-1| < 0.025}          -0.03  -0.05 
       (0.02)  (0.02) 
        
N 92,412  92,412  92,412  92,412 92,412 92,412 
R
2  0.0025 0.0005 0.0029 0.0027 0.0005 0.0032  
Table 7. Net withdrawals of dividends and total returns: The effect of delayed reinvestment. OLS regressions 
of net withdrawals on dividends and total returns and 11-month lags of dividends and total returns. Net withdrawals 
are equal to household monthly net withdrawals. All data are scaled by household account value in period t-1 and 
expressed in percentage terms. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions include 
an intercept (not reported in the table).  
 
  Linear Regressions  Piecewise Linear Regressions 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
Dt/At-1  0.35   0.35  0.81   0.80 
  (0.09)   (0.09)  (0.10)   (0.10) 
Dt/At-1* {Dt/At-1 > 90
th Pctle}      -0.48   -0.47 
      (0.12)   (0.12) 
11
1 Σs=1 to 11 Dt-s/At-1  0.01   0.01  -0.16   -0.07 
  (0.10)   (0.10)  (0.17)   (0.18) 
11
1 Σs=1 to 11 Dt-s/At-1* {Dt-s/At-1 > 90
th Pctle}      0.14   0.07 
      (0.18)   (0.18) 
Rt/At-1   0.02 0.02   0.02 0.02 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Rt/At-1* {|Rt/At-1| < 0.025}       -0.03  -0.04 
       (0.02)  (0.02) 
11
1 Σs=1 to 11 Rt-s/At-1   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
11
1 Σs=1 to 11 Rt-s/At-1* {|Rt-s/At-1| < 0.025}       0.03  -0.06 
       (0.06)  (0.06) 
        
N  92,412 92,412 92,412 92,412 92,412 92,412 
R
2  0.0025 0.0005 0.0029 0.0027 0.0005 0.0032  
Table 8. Net withdrawals of dividends and total returns: By household type. OLS regressions of net withdrawals on dividends and total returns and 11-
month lags of dividends and total returns. Net withdrawals are equal to household monthly net withdrawals. All data are scaled by household account value in 
period t-1 and expressed in percentage terms. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Household portfolio value is the average monthly 
portfolio value. Household net worth and tax rate are self-reported data supplied to the brokerage firm at the time of the opening of the account. The regressions 
include an intercept (not reported in the table). 
 
 
Household Portfolio Value  Household Net Worth  Household Tax Rate 
Household Portfolio 
Turnover 
  <Median >Median >0.5*NW <Median >Median <Median >Median <Median >Median 
Dt/At-1  0.77 0.80 0.84 0.67 0.81 0.44 1.00 0.75 0.89 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.43) (0.32) (0.36) (0.29) (0.40) (0.07) (0.19) 
Dt/At-1* {Dt/At-1 > 90
th Pctle}  -0.43 -0.48 -0.54 -0.16 -0.72 -0.32 -0.57 -0.45 -0.52 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.44) (0.32) (0.36) (0.30) (0.41) (0.11) (0.21) 
Rt/At-1  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Rt/At-1* {|Rt/At-1| < 0.025}  0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) 
           
N  45,092  47,320 6,240  11,947 7,973  11,768 8,152  48,353  44,059 
R
2  0.0042 0.0026 0.0012 0.0035 0.0010 0.0021 0.0026 0.0062 0.0029  
Table 9. Net withdrawals and the composition of dividends. OLS regressions of net withdrawals on dividends 
and total returns and 11-month lags of dividends and total returns. Net withdrawals are equal to household monthly 
net withdrawals. Ordinary dividends are equal to the dividend yield from CRSP (distribution codes distribution 
codes 1000 through 1999 excluding codes 1262 and 1272) on common stock account holdings at t-1. Mutual fund 
dividends are equal to the dividend yield from the CRSP mutual fund database on mutual fund account holdings at t-
1. Special dividends are all other dividends. All data are scaled by household account value in period t-1 and 
expressed in percentage terms. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions include 
an intercept (not reported in the table). 
 
 
Ordinary Dividends  Mutual Fund Dividends 
Special and Other 
Dividends 
  1  2  1  2  1  2 
Dt/At-1  0.82 0.71 0.40 0.35 0.75 0.75 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Dt/At-1* {Dt/At-1 > 90
th Pctle}  0.16  0.16 -0.26 -0.23 -0.46 -0.46 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) 
Rt/At-1  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rt/At-1* {|Rt/At-1| < 0.025}  -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dt-12/At   0.13   0.05    -0.08 
   (0.09)   (0.06)   (0.04) 
        
N (000)  92.4 92.4 92.4 92.4 92.4 92.4 
R
2  0.0023 0.0023 0.0007 0.0007 0.0021 0.0022 
 